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Cooperation is widespread in human societies, but its maintenance at the group level 
remains puzzling if individuals benefit from not cooperating. Explanations of the 
maintenance of cooperation generally assume that cooperative and non-cooperative 
behavior in others can be assessed and copied accurately. However, humans have a well 
known capacity to deceive and thus to manipulate how others assess their behavior. Here, 
we show that hypocrisy - claiming to be acting cooperatively while acting selfishly - can 
maintain social cooperation because it prevents the spread of selfish behavior. We 
demonstrate this effect both theoretically and experimentally. Hypocrisy allows the 
cooperative strategy to spread by taking credit for the success of the non-cooperative 
strategy.  
 
 
The maintenance of cooperation is perhaps one of the greatest enigmas in all of biology. In 
systems where non-cooperation is more beneficial to an individual than cooperation, why does 
cooperation persist? Among numerous theories that have been proposed in the past few decades, 
reciprocity (both direct and indirect)(1, 2), kin selection(3) and group selection(4), and spatial 
dynamics(5, 6) are the ones most frequently employed to account for this puzzling 
phenomenon.(7) In addition, punishment and reward have been identified as important 
contributors to the maintenance of cooperation in human societies.(8-13) The explanatory power 
for the maintenance of cooperation is usually assessed in game-theoretic models that assume 
faithful transmission (barring random mutation) of the cooperative or selfish behavior. If the 
behavior is transmitted genetically, faithful transmission is a valid assumption. However, if the 
behavior is adopted by imitation, as is generally the case in human affairs, then faithful 
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transmission requires that the behavior can be accurately inferred.(11, 14) Unless the behavior 
can be directly observed, it must be inferred through other means such as communications, thus 
allowing for the possibility of deception. 
In the context of the game theoretic model of cooperation without direct observation, an 
individual may act selfishly while claiming to be cooperative. Such hypocritical behavior is 
indeed observed commonly in psychological studies, where it is argued that hypocrites benefit 
not only from reaping the rewards of selfish behavior, but also “garner the social and self-
rewards of being seen and seeing oneself as upstanding and moral”(15). Here, we argue that 
hypocrisy can promote the maintenance of cooperation in the population: even if a hypocrite acts 
selfishly, hypocrisy masks the selfish behavior, preventing it from spreading. We demonstrate 
this effect with a mathematical model, a computational agent-based simulation model, and an 
online experiment carried out on Amazon Mechanical Turk(16, 17). 
To assess the effect of hypocrisy on the maintenance of cooperation, we use a common model of 
cooperation, the public goods game(1, 11, 16, 18, 19). In the standard public goods game, 
players have the option of cooperating by donating to a pool. The donations are then multiplied 
by a constant and evenly divided between the other players regardless of whether they 
cooperated or not. In this game, non-cooperating individuals will on average have a higher 
payoff than cooperating individuals because they don’t pay the cost of donating. If strategies 
with higher payoffs are more often replicated, then the cooperative strategy will become less 
common over time despite the fact that the population would be best off if everyone would 
cooperate. 
We introduce a modification that concerns the copying process of strategies. It is typically 
assumed that strategies are faithfully copied (barring mutation), either through biological 
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transmission(20) (e.g. genetic inheritance), or through cultural transmission(14, 16, 21) (e.g. 
observational learning). This faithful copying process rests on the assumption that the 
information transmitted from sender (individual to be copied) to receiver (copying individual) is 
accurate. The modification that we introduce here is that the information does not need to be 
accurate. Specifically, we allow for selfish individuals to deceive others about their previous 
behavior during the imitation process, i.e. to falsely claim that they have been cooperative.  
We can thus describe an individual by two attributes with respect to cooperation and 
transmission. First, an individual can be described by the strategy played (cooperative or selfish). 
Second, and individual can also be described by the strategy transmitted. Standard models of 
cooperation don’t need to make this distinction because the assumed faithful copying process 
described above - however, in our model, the uncoupling of the strategy played from the strategy 
transmitted is essential. In order to study the effect of hypocrisy, we assume that there are two 
types of individuals, non-hypocritical and hypocritical. A non-hypocritical individual will always 
transmit the strategy that it has just played. A hypocritical individual will always transmit the 
cooperative strategy, regardless of the strategy that it has just played (Figure 1). We will later 
modify this definition and assume that a hypocritical individual will always transmit the opposite 
of the strategy that it has just played. While this latter scenario is perhaps not in line with the 
common definition of the word hypocrisy, it will provide a conservative baseline for the 
maintenance of cooperation because it forces hypocritical individuals to transmit the non-
cooperative strategy even if it has just played the cooperative strategy (see supplementary 
material). 
We develop a mathematical model (see supplemental 2 for details) that calculates the 
equilibrium frequency of cooperation c given a constant frequency of hypocrisy h in the 
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population. It can be shown that for a population of any size, c will go to an equilibrium defined 
by:  
            
             (1) 
 
Low levels of random strategy exploration does not fundamentally modify the outcome. These 
results were confirmed by computational agent-based simulations. A detailed description of the 
mathematical and computational model is given in the supplementary material. 
We tested these predictions experimentally by setting up an online experiment on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (AMT), a widely used online platform(16, 17) to recruit participants from a 
diverse pool. We implemented a public goods game and recruited 414 adults on AMT to 
participate. Initially, each participant was assigned a random strategy (cooperative or 
noncooperative), but after each round, participants were allowed to switch strategies. Each 
round, the participants were shown their payoff in that round, and the payoff and strategy of 
another player chosen at random. Importantly, participants were not informed that they were 
playing a public goods game, and the strategies shown were simply labeled A and B. Thus, 
participants had no prior knowledge of the underlying game design, but were only informed at 
the beginning that they would be paid according to their performance. 
 In order to test the effect of hypocrisy on cooperation, we compared 4 different levels of 
hypocrisy h = 0%, 25%, 50% or 75%, and ran 10 independent trials per hypocrisy level, where 
each trial is a game with maximally 12 participants playing 10 rounds (participants were 
prohibited from playing more than one game). If a participant played the noncooperative 
strategy, her strategy was falsely shown to others as cooperative with probability h. This allowed 
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us to implement hypocrisy without letting participants know that we did, preventing any bias that 
such knowledge might have introduced. Because the experimental setup of each trial is identical 
with the exception of h, any difference in the observed frequency of cooperation can be 
attributed to the effect of hypocrisy. 
 The results of the online experiment are in agreement with the predictions made by the 
mathematical and computational models (Figure 2). After random initiation, the cooperation 
frequency follows the predicted trajectories, attaining near-equilibrium value given by equation 
(1) after 10 rounds. Using Tukey's honest significance test, we find that the frequency of 
cooperation is significantly different among all tested levels of hypocrisy (see supplemental table 
1). 
 We’ve shown here that hypocrisy allows for the maintenance of cooperation in a public 
goods game. In the standard public goods game without hypocrisy, cooperation cannot be 
maintained because non-cooperative individuals fare better than cooperative individuals, and 
their non-cooperative strategy is adopted by others wanting to maximize their payoffs. It’s 
important to note that the addition of hypocrisy to the public goods game does not affect any of 
these underlying assumptions: selfish individuals are still doing better, and individuals are still 
adopting the strategies of those around them with the highest payoffs. The only difference is that 
hypocrisy makes non-cooperative individuals with high payoffs appear cooperative, leading to 
the adoption of cooperation: Hypocrisy allows the cooperative strategy to spread by taking credit 
for the success of the non-cooperative strategy. 
 Punishment of non-cooperative behavior is a well documented solution to problem of 
cooperation in human communities(8-13, 22). We may hypothesize that hypocrisy has evolved 
as a means to avoid punishment, providing obvious benefits in addition to those gained by social 
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or self-rewards(15, 23). Our model makes no claim as to why hypocrisy exists, and at what 
frequencies - it is only concerned with its effect on the maintenance of cooperation. Since 
hypocrisy is a form of deception, we would expect evolutionary pressure to detect hypocrisy and 
consequent counter-pressure to avoid detection, leading to an ongoing arm’s race. Low levels of 
hypocrisy detection abilities however do not seem to change our results (see supplementary 
material). 
Supplementary material is available at www.salathegroup.com 
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FIGURE CAPTIONS 
 
Figure 1 
A visual representation of the reported behavior (background) and the actual behavior (circle) for 
each combination of game and reporting strategies. Honest individuals report the same strategy 
that they actually did while hypocrites always report that they cooperated. (Key: Red = Defect, 
Blue = Cooperate) 
 
 
Figure 2 
Dynamics predicted by the mathematical (solid lines) and agent based (dashed lines) models 
compared to the observed frequency of cooperation observed in the AMT experiments (circles). 
Transparent circles are the frequencies from each of the experimental groups, while the solid 
circles are the means of all of the experiments per level of hypocrisy and round. Horizontal 
jittering added for better visibility.
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